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monetary claim to repetition of those payments;18 and under section 75 that claim
can be exercised against the creditor and set off against the liability under the loan. It
might be arguable that in connected sale-and-loan cases the debtor who has rejected
the goods also has the right to repetition of the full price even although that price
was de facto paid by the creditor; the supplier who has been paid for goods sold
surely cannot deny the debtor-buyer repetition of that price on the grounds that the
payment was actually made by a third party. If this is right, then exercising a “like
claim” against the creditor will again simply involve extinguishing the loan obligations.
It is by no means clear that the suggested policy argument can trump the argument
from the language of the Act; but it is as clear from the First Division’s decision as it
was to the present writer in 1984 that “the 1974 Act has not made all other law on sale
of goods and breach of contract irrelevant. The Act must be considered against the
wider legal background”.19 The policy argument is not wholly unsupported by legal
ones.
Two final thoughts. The consumer, Mr Durkin, bought his laptop from PC World
in 1998. It took 12 years for his case to get as far as Parliament House. No doubt there
are many reasons for this, but how many consumers would or could last this long in
pursuit of their claims? The other is the complete lack of customer care displayed by
the supplier and the creditor (in particular) in dealing with Mr Durkin’s claims at the
outset of the problem. For that reason alone, one hopes the First Division’s is not the
final word on the subject.20
Hector MacQueen
Scottish Law Commission
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Mutuality, Retention and Set-Off: Inveresk plc v
Tullis Russell Papermakers Ltd
A. THE PROBLEM OF RECIPROCITY IN CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATIONS
Mutuality provides the most important principle governing the relationship between
breach of contract and contractual performance. It can justify the withholding of
performance as a response to breach and explains when performance by one party
may be considered conditional upon performance by the other party because their
18 See W M Gloag, The Law of Contract, 2nd edn (1929) 59-60. Cf W W McBryde, The Law of Contract
in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) paras 20.142-143.
19 MacQueen (n 16) at 67.
20 It is understood, however, that lack of resources means that there will be no appeal to the Supreme
Court by Mr Durkin.
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obligations are reciprocal in nature. Nevertheless, since receiving detailed judicial
elaboration by the House of Lords in Bank of East Asia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise,1
a tension has arisen over the precise extent to which obligations on each side of a
contract should be considered reciprocal between the parties and therefore to be
treated as direct counterparts. Retention – the withholding of performance – is only
permissible in this context when the obligations are counterparts. The question is
whether the contract should be seen in essence as an indivisible unity in which all
obligations on one side are normally counterparts of those on the other, or as a
structured set of distinct obligations which may or may not be counterparts of one
another. Interpreting the terms of the contract to elicit the intentions of the parties
plays a crucial role, of course, but once this is done the scope of the principle of
mutuality becomes fundamental in determining the rights of the parties once a breach
has occurred.
In this regard, Bank of East Asia and the subsequent Inner House case of Macari
v Celtic Football and Athletic Co Ltd2 seemed to mark a significant clarification
of how the doctrine should be applied, emphasising that obligations should be
contemporaneous as well as reciprocal, and that not all obligations on one side of
a contract were automatically counterparts of those on the other. In both cases
obligations in particular contracts were distinguished as not being counterparts of
one another, meaning that parties in breach were not able to justify withholding
performance of the obligation in question. However, a series of opinions by Lord
Drummond Young, sitting in Outer House cases such as Hoult v Turpie3 and Purac
Ltd v Byzac Ltd,4 has subsequently sought to revive an older emphasis on the unity of
the contract. A substantial divergence of view about the application of the mutuality
principle therefore opened up, awaiting further clarification from an appellate
court.
B. THE SCOPE OF THE DECISION IN INVERESK
In Inveresk plc v Tullis Russell Papermakers Ltd5 the Supreme Court has provided
an answer which sides with the unity of contract approach but also extends the
application of mutuality and retention in important respects. However, it also went on
(in Lord Rodger’s judgment) to examine quite independently the scope of retention
as a wider remedial category in its own right, and for which the principle of
mutuality is only one of a number of possible grounds which also includes set-off,
or compensation. This has allowed the interaction between mutuality, retention and
set-off to be considered, providing very helpful elucidation of a highly technical and
complex area in which substantive rights interact with procedural rules as well as
the equitable jurisdiction of the court. Whilst Lord Hope’s judgment is important
1 1997 SLT 1213.
2 1999 SC 628.
3 2004 SLT 308.
4 2005 SLT 37.
5 [2010] UKSC 19, 2010 SLT 941.
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from a doctrinal point of view because of its focus upon the scope of mutuality
in justifying retention, Lord Rodger’s makes a significant contribution in explaining
how retention may also arise under different criteria in the context of set-off, and
how this differs from but may interact with retention justified on the basis of
mutuality.
C. THE DISPUTE IN INVERESK
The facts of Inveresk posed a new problem. A sale was concluded between paper
manufacturers, but the overall agreement was constituted by two separate contracts
which addressed different aspects of the agreement. One contract provided for the
sale by Inveresk to Tullis Russell of intellectual property rights to certain brands
of paper, associated customer information and related assets (the Asset Purchase
Agreement). Payment was by way of an Initial Consideration (£5 million) with an
Additional Consideration to follow calculated according to the volume of certain
sales achieved by the buyer in the year or so following the sale. An important
aspect of the sale was to impose further obligations on the seller, Inveresk, under
a further contract (the Services Agreement) which required Inveresk to continue to
manufacture, distribute and sell certain products for several months after the sale,
thus safeguarding the maintenance of the value of the brand, and facilitating the
transfer of customer business and integration of manufacturing and distribution of the
product into the operations of the buyer, Tullis Russell. In return, further sums were
payable by Tullis Russell to Inveresk under the Services Agreement. The litigation
arose because Inveresk raised an action for payment of the Additional Consideration
against Tullis Russell, who defended the claim on two grounds: first, that the
Additional Consideration had not been determined under the relevant contractual
provisions, and secondly, even if it had been, it was nevertheless entitled to withhold
payment since Inveresk was in breach of the Services Agreement. Tullis Russell raised
a separate action for breach of contract in this regard. Lord Hope addressed the first
ground, and in an exhaustive and convincing analysis based on detailed interpretation
of the contract terms concluded that the Additional Consideration had not been
determined in accordance with the contract, and thus was not yet payable. The action
was to be remitted back to the Commercial Court for further procedure to resolve
this question. However, the wider significance of the Supreme Court’s decision
lies in the obiter remarks of Lord Hope and Lord Rodger concerning the second
ground.
D. MUTUALITY
Tullis Russell’s submission was that even if the Additional Consideration were to be
ascertained it was entitled to retention of this payment under the Asset Purchase
Agreement “pending” payment of its claims for breach of contract under the Services
Agreement. The problem was that the matters in dispute between the parties related
to obligations which had been enshrined in two separate contracts. The argument
of Inveresk was twofold: first, retention could only operate “where the respective
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claims arise out of one contract”, as opposed to “two contracts, albeit both arising
from a single transaction”,6 so obligations constituted in separate contracts could not
be counterparts; secondly, in any event, even if the contracts were treated as a unity,
the obligations in question were not counterparts of each other.
Lord Hope decisively rejected both arguments. On the first, he sided with the
approach of Lord Glennie in the Outer House in rejecting the formalism of Inveresk’s
submission that obligations in one contract could not be regarded as counterparts of
those in another. Instead he stressed an “overall agreement” or “same transaction”
approach, grounded quite simply in giving effect to the intentions of the parties and
recognising that one agreement may for various legitimate reasons be given effect
through two or more separately constituted contracts or “contractual documents”.
Nothing could be automatically assumed about the intentions of the parties from the
structuring of their agreement or “transaction” into more than one such contract.
Form alone was not determinative. Lord Hope observed that “the question in each
case of retention will be whether the obligations that are founded on, wherever
they are to be found, are truly counterparts of each other. It goes without saying
that they must both be part of the same transaction, as there can be no mutuality
between two or more transactions each of which has a life of its own” (emphasis
added).7
On the second argument, however, Lord Hope disagreed with Lord Glennie’s
application of the mutuality principle and concluded that the obligations in question
were indeed counterparts. Why? Lord Glennie had viewed the obligations in question
as lacking reciprocity and contemporaneousness because they related to distinct
stages of the transaction. However, in Lord Hope’s eyes, this gave insufficient weight
to the “overall purpose and effect of the transaction”. Instead, “the guiding principle
is that the unity of the overall transaction should be respected. The analysis should
start from the position that all the obligations that it embraces are to be regarded
as counterparts of each other unless there is a clear indication to the contrary”.8 It
was “unrealistic” to treat the transaction as “divisible into a series of separate and
unrelated compartments. The obligations undertaken by Inveresk were all designed
to serve the same end”.9
E. RETENTION AND SET-OFF
Lord Rodger agreed with Lord Hope’s analysis of mutuality but devoted his judgment
to expounding what he characterised as a further and wholly distinguishable basis
alongside that of mutuality for Tullis Russell’s retention of any payment under the
Asset Purchase Agreement. This basis was the law of set-off. In doing so Lord Rodger
was highly critical of counsel for appearing to overlook the existence of this second
basis for retention. He applied this criticism to the Inner House even more forcefully,
6 Para 27.
7 Para 36.
8 Para 42.
9 Para 45.
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rejecting their apparent “confining” of the role of retention to mutual obligations
and noting that “the approach of the Extra Division conflates two different legal
doctrines” which Scots law “unhelpfully” calls retention in both cases.10 In a sense it is
understandable how this mistake could arise, since retention under a contract arises
as a doctrine expressing the relevant rules and principles governing the conduct of the
parties in relation to the principle of mutuality. However, it also arises outside contract
law as a doctrine governing the enforcement of claims in relation to the operation of
set-off. The wider point of Lord Rodger’s judgment is simply to emphasise that as
retention is a doctrinal category in its own right and not a single doctrine coextensive
with or simply derived from mutuality, considering it systematically as a separate
category is necessary in order to expose clearly to view the existence of “two different
types of retention”.11
Whereas retention based on mutuality is an entitlement of a contracting party,
Lord Rodger points to a second form of retention based solely on the equitable
jurisdiction of the court and involving the temporary procedural suspension of a
payment claim pending ascertainment of a counterclaim arising from some other
obligation. Lord Rodger expresses the anxiety that “there is a risk that its existence will
continue to be overlooked”.12 This analysis might seem at first sight rather startling,
especially to those who have equated retention simply with mutuality. In fact it draws
upon a well-established body of law, and one clearly stated in modern academic works
as well as in the older authorities helpfully discussed by Lord Rodger.13 However, it
is one which is normally treated within the category of set-off and as such might
appear to have no direct relevance to claims based on mutuality. Indeed, it would
seem that counsel simply failed to think beyond the principle of mutuality. This
is surprising, given that Tullis Russell was simultaneously pursuing its own breach
of contract claim against Inveresk, meaning that the availability of set-off would
always have been relevant. This omission could have had major repercussions had the
Supreme Court followed Lord Glennie in the Outer House in viewing the obligations
between the parties as not being counterparts, because the law of set-off would still
have provided a further possible basis for withholding payment to Inveresk. Indeed
Lord Rodger indicated that if it had been pleaded, the circumstances in Inveresk
were “potentially, sufficiently special to justify a departure from the general rule” so
that the court would have permitted retention of the Additional Consideration on this
ground.14 Essentially Lord Rodger’s judgment is a sharp reminder that the law of set-
off ought to have been considered in formulating Tullis Russell’s defences, since there
is an equitable power in the court exceptionally to defer consideration of a claim for
10 Para 57.
11 Paras 56, 57 and 59.
12 Para 77.
13 W M Gloag and R C Henderson, The Law of Scotland, 12th edn (2007) paras 3.32 and 10.15; W W
McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3rd edn (2007) para 25.57; W A Wilson, The Scottish Law
of Debt, 2nd edn (1991) paras 13.5 and 13.9.
14 Para 112.
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payment when this may be met by a defence of set-off in relation to a claim for a debt
which can imminently be made liquid.15
F. CONCLUSION
Inveresk would seem to bring authoritative clarification to the question when one
contractual obligation should be considered the counterpart to another. However, in
an important sense the Supreme Court has simply restored the traditional emphasis
on the unity of the contract to be found in much older cases such as Turnbull v
McLean, but slightly obscured by the more recent approach in Bank of East Asia and
Macari.16 There is less inconsistency in this than might appear, since the problem
for the courts is that different types of contract bring out different aspects of the
mutuality principle. In some contracts (such as an employment contract) there will
be obligations with no counterpart at all, whilst in others the performance obligations
will often be structured in stages which might lack contemporaneousness (such as a
building contract) or might not (such as a sale). The doctrine is therefore re-framed
to help make sense of its application in each new context, but without necessarily
intending any innovation. Nevertheless, Inveresk has innovated by establishing a
presumption that obligations are counterparts, and the question will simply be
whether it is sufficiently clear in future cases how this may be rebutted. Lord
Hope referred to the need for a “clear indication to the contrary”.17 The other
new element in Inveresk is the stress on a purposive approach which focusses
upon obligations within an overall “transaction”, however constituted in terms of
separate contracts. This aligns well with the modern approach to related areas
such as contractual interpretation, bringing to mind Lord Wilberforce’s regard in
that context for “the commercial purpose of the contract”.18 Again, the question
will be whether the concept of “transaction” has been clearly enough defined
and conceptualised, or whether it will give birth to a new area of ambiguity and
uncertainty.
Regarding retention, Lord Rodger’s dismissal of “the erroneous basis that in Scots
law the whole matter is regulated by fixed rules and that the court has no power
to intervene where it would be equitable to do so”19 should not be seen to have
any adverse impact on the availability of retention justified by mutuality. It is clearly
directed towards the operation of set-off. However, Lord Rodger’s decision to adopt
retention itself as the principal category around which to structure his discussion
might risk causing some confusion, given that his objective is to articulate two very
distinct “doctrines” of retention which have little in common with one another in
doctrinal or policy terms. The policy behind mutuality relates to promoting the
performance of contracts, whereas the policy of set-off is “to avoid a multiplicity of
15 Paras 79 and 83.
16 Turnbull v McLean (1874) 1 R 730.
17 Para 42.
18 Reardon Smith Line v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989 at 995.
19 Para 52.
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actions, and to save unnecessary expense”.20 In some ways, Lord Rodger is simply
reviving an older category of treatment which was used by Gloag and Irvine in their
discussion of “the law of retention of debts”.21 However, given the different basis for
each type of retention, a taxonomy based on different “doctrines” of retention might
be less clear than one in which the main level of analysis relates to the substantive
basis for the retention in question, i.e. mutuality, or set-off. In other words, it is not
so much that retention was misunderstood in Inveresk as that set-off was overlooked.
On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the unfortunate omission of the set-
off argument in Inveresk would have been avoided under Lord Rodger’s systematic
analysis of retention.
A further interesting point also emerges from Lord Rodger’s judgment, which
flows from his analysis of how breach is “made good” through damages. If
Inveresk were held to be in breach of their obligations to Tullis Russell, then
“by paying . . . damages, they, in effect, make good their failure to perform their
obligations under the Services Agreement and become entitled to the Additional
Consideration”.22 Thus a right of retention grounded inmutuality does not necessarily
persist for ever, if the party who retains performance progresses to completion a claim
for damages. This important point is not always made clear in discussions of the scope
of mutuality, and Lord Rodger’s elaboration of it is extremely valuable. Damages
purify the breach in question, and thereby release the party in breach to sue on the
contract. In practice this may facilitate set-off. However, it is significant that whether
this happens or not is within the control of the innocent party – it may decline to
pursue its damages claim, as in Graham v United Turkey Red,23 in which case the
contract-breaker does remain permanently barred from pursuing its own contractual
claim. This may effectively lead to a disproportionate “forfeiture” in cases where
that contractual claim exceeds the loss which could have been claimed in damages,24
though if the contract has been rescinded Graham suggests that a remedy quantum
lucratus, i.e. in unjustified enrichment, may nevertheless provide some redress (only
if it is pleaded, of course, which in Graham it was not). Lord Rodger’s contribution is
therefore not only to elucidate the wider remedial category of retention and to stress
the role and breadth of the equitable power of the court in the context of set-off, but
also to elucidate the complexity of the ways in which retention, mutuality and set-off
may interact with judicial remedies and the wider law of obligations.
A Mark Godfrey
University of Glasgow
(I am very grateful to my colleagues John McLeod and Iain MacNeil for discussing
the case with me and commenting upon a draft of this note.)
20 Burt v Bell (1861) 24 D 13 at 14 per the Lord President (McNeill); McBryde, Contract (n 13) 745.
21 W M Gloag and J M Irvine, Law of Rights in Security (1897) 304.
22 Para 76.
23 1922 SC 533.
24 Graham v United Turkey Red 1922 SC 533 at 537 per Lord Anderson.
